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FEDERAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AFTER ELECTROLUX 
Jason Harris* 
I INTRODUCTION 
The Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ('the Act') pt VIB establishes a framework for the 
registration and enforcement of certified agreements, which are collective industrial 
instruments that regulate the employment relationship for a significant proportion of 
the workforce.1 The Act provides for agreements between unions of employees and 
employers and agreements between employers and employees directly.2 A certified 
agreement comes into effect only after it is approved by the employer and a 'valid 
majority' of its employees3 and is registered by the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission ('the Commission').4 The significance of registration of a certified 
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1  Recent Australian Bureau of Statistics figures indicate that collective industrial agreements, 
such as certified agreements, regulate terms and conditions of approximately 41 per cent of 
the Australian workforce: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Methods of Setting Pay' (2003) 
6105.0 Australian Labour Market Statistics 26. 
2  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 170LJ, 170LK. The Act also provides for certified 
agreements between employers and unions in settlement of an industrial dispute: 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) pt IVB, div 3. There are also greenfields agreements 
where employees have not yet been engaged on a new worksite: Workplace Relations Act 
1996 (Cth) s 170LL. The Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) will 
retain these agreements: see ss 96A (employee/employer collective agreements), 96B 
(employer/union collective agreements), 96C (union greenfields agreements). There is also 
a new non-union greenfields agreement: s 96D. 
3  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 170LE, 170LJ(2), 170LK(1). The Act defines a 'valid 
majority' as a majority of persons employed at a particular time whose employment is or 
will be subject to the agreement: Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 170LE.  
4  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 170LT(5), 170LX. The Workplace Relations Amendment 
(Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) provides for agreements to take effect once they are lodged 
with the Office of Employment Advocate, rather than requiring the parties to register the 
agreement with the Commission, which the current law requires: see new pt VB, div 5, 
s 100.  
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agreement lies in the imposition of legally enforceable rights and obligations upon the 
parties bound by the agreement. One of the most significant obligations imposed on 
the parties bound by a registered certified agreement is the obligation not to engage in 
industrial action for the duration of the agreement, which is ordinarily no longer than 
three years.5  
While industrial action may not be lawfully undertaken by the parties during the 
term of the certified agreement,6 the Act does allow industrial action to be taken after 
the nominal expiry of the certified agreement,7 provided that the parties are 
negotiating a new agreement during a bargaining period.8 Industrial action will only 
be permitted if it is taken for the purpose of 'supporting or advancing claims made in 
respect of the proposed agreement'.9 Until recently, it was commonly thought that the 
reference to the 'proposed agreement' in this context was simply to the proposed 
certified agreement that the parties were negotiating. The proposed agreement must be 
precisely identified because it is only industrial action taken in support of that 
agreement that gains the protection of the Act.   
It is important to note that not all agreements negotiated between the parties are 
capable of being certified by the Commission. Section 170LI of the Act provides that an 
agreement may only be submitted for certification by the Commission if it is 'about 
matters pertaining to the relationship between' employers and their employees.10 The 
issue concerning whether or not a particular matter pertains to the employment 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
5  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 170MC, 170MN. The Workplace Relations Amendment 
(Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) allows certified agreements to last for no more than five years, 
although greenfields agreements will only be permitted to last for one year: s 101. 
6  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 170MN. The Workplace Relations Amendment (Work 
Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) contains the same prohibition: ss 108E, 110.  
7  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 170LX(2), 170MN, 170ML. The Workplace Relations 
Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) contains a similar provision: s 108.  
8  Either party to the agreement may initiate a bargaining period by giving notice to the other 
party: Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 170MI–170MK. The Workplace Relations 
Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) contains a similar provision: s 107. 
9  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 170ML(2). For a detailed discussion of the procedures 
involved in taking protected industrial action see Greg McCarry, 'Industrial Action Under 
the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)' (1997) 10 Australian Journal of Labour Law 133; Victor 
Di Felice, 'Stopping or Preventing Industrial Action in Australia' (2000) 24 Melbourne 
University Law Review 310; Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (4th ed, 2005) 
ch 18. The Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) maintains this 
position: s 108(2), 108(3). 
10  See further Creighton and Stewart, above n 9, ch 4. The Workplace Relations Amendment 
(Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) represents a change in the constitutional basis of the Workplace 
Relations Act 1996 (Cth), from the conciliation and arbitration power (s 51(xxxv) of the 
Constitution) to the corporations power (s 51(xx) of the Constitution). There is therefore no 
similar requirement that agreement be about matters pertaining to the employment 
relationship, as this phrase was a requirement of the regulation of industrial disputes that 
was necessary to bring the law within the conciliation and arbitration power. The new use 
of the corporations power means that the requirement of interstate labour disputes is no 
longer needed. However, the limitations imposed by the current s 170LI appear to be 
repeated under the new concept of  'prohibited content', which is dealt with in more detail 
in the Postscript below.  
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relationship has been a long standing feature of Australian industrial relations law 
because of its connection with the meaning of an industrial dispute under the award 
system. For much of the last 100 years Australian industrial relations laws have been 
based on the settlement of industrial disputes through the use of compulsory 
arbitration in the form of award–making by the Commission and its predecessors. The 
concept of an industrial dispute was itself based on, inter alia, the requirement that the 
dispute be about matters pertaining to the relationship between employers and 
employees.11 Unfortunately, the High Court of Australia has been unable to develop a 
clear and consistent interpretation of what matters may or may not pertain to the 
relationship between employers and employees. Early decisions defined the concept of 
matters pertaining to the employment relationship relatively broadly. However, in 
later decisions a more restrictive approach was adopted.12 The prevailing view seems 
to accept that a matter does not pertain to the employment relationship merely because 
it involves employers and employees. Rather, the matter must relate to the employer 
and employee in their capacity as such.13 For example, the provision of 
superannuation is a matter pertaining to the employment relationship because it forms 
part of the remuneration for the work performed and therefore impacts on the parties 
because of their employment status.14 However, while an employee may have a dispute 
with their employer because of the employer's social or political views, such a dispute 
is not of itself a matter pertaining to the employment relationship, because it does not 
arise because of the employment status, but rather because of the nature of the social or 
political view held.15  
Until recently there has been considerable confusion about whether each individual 
clause in a proposed certified agreement must satisfy the s 170LI requirements, or 
rather, whether the proposed agreement should be characterised as a whole.16 The 
High Court's majority decision in Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' 
Union17 has found that an agreement cannot be characterised as a 'proposed 
agreement' for the purposes of taking protected industrial action if it contains 
substantive clauses that do not pertain to the relationship between the employer and 
its employees. This therefore requires that the proposed agreement between the parties 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
11  The Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) s 4(1) defined an industrial dispute by reference to 
matters pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees, while its 
predecessor the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 4(1) defined an industrial 
dispute by reference to industrial matters, which were themselves defined by reference to 
'all matters pertaining to the relations of employers and employees'. 
12  Creighton and Stewart, above n 9, [4.26]–[4.32]. 
13  R v Kelly; Ex parte Victoria (1950) 81 CLR 64, 84. 
14  Re Manufacturing Grocers Employees Federation of Australia (1986) 160 CLR 341. 
15  R v Coldham; Ex parte Fitzsimmons (1976) 137 CLR 153, 163 (Stephen J). 
16  Compare Re Atlas Steels Metals Distribution Certified Agreement 2001–2003 (2002) 114 IR 62 
('Re Atlas Steels') and Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers Union [2001] 
FCA 1600 ('Electrolux (FCA Merkel J)') with Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing 
and Kindred Industries Union v Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd (2002) 118 FCR 177 
('Electrolux (FCFC)') and Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred 
Industries Union v Unilever Australia Ltd (2003) 132 IR 34 ('Unilever'). See also Leigh Johns, 
'To Certify or Not to Certify? – That is (Still) the Question' (2003) 16 Australian Journal of 
Labour Law 108. 
17  (2004) 209 ALR 116 ('Electrolux'). 
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be assessed clause by clause to determine if there are any clauses that do not pertain to 
the employment relationship. 
This article will consider the High Court's reasoning in the Electrolux case and the 
legal and practical consequences that flow from the decision. It will be argued that the 
majority decision unfortunately adopted a narrow construction of the Act that will 
cause, and indeed is already causing, substantial difficulties and uncertainty about the 
process of federal collective bargaining in Australia. It is submitted that the result of 
this decision is a federal collective bargaining regime that is less efficient and more 
complex than necessary. Furthermore, it will be argued that the effect of the decision is 
to impose unrealistic demands on parties to certified agreements in a manner that 
unreasonably interferes with the balance of power in collective bargaining 
negotiations. Lastly, this article will evaluate the possible options for collective 
bargaining that lie outside of the formal certification process in the Act.  
In order to fully appreciate the significance of the Electrolux decision it is 
appropriate to first consider the scope of the legal rights to take industrial action which 
have been limited by the ruling. 
A  The importance of industrial action 
While the Act provides the framework for registering a collective agreement assented 
to by an employer and its employees, the Act does not provide a comprehensive code 
about how these agreements are to be reached. The actual process of reaching a 
collective agreement is left largely to the parties to determine.18 This is consistent with 
the statutory objects provided in the Act, which relevantly state that the purpose of the 
Act is to provide a framework for promoting the determination of employment terms 
and conditions at the enterprise level, with employers and employees permitted to 
reach an agreement that is most suitable to them regardless of whether or not that 
agreement is provided for in the Act.19 Therefore, it can be said that Australia's federal 
collective bargaining regime provides for the parties to determine the workplace terms 
and conditions governing their employment relationship without third party 
interference. This also means that disputes about the form and content of any 
agreement must generally be resolved by the parties themselves at the enterprise 
level.20  
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
18  One of the features of the recent Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 
(Cth) has been to increase attention on alternative dispute resolution between employers 
and employees/unions: see the newly inserted Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) pt VIIA. 
19  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 3(b), 3(c). The Workplace Relations Amendment (Work 
Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) replaces these provisions with similarly worded goals: ss 3(d), 3(e). 
20  The Commission is generally prohibited from exercising its arbitration powers during a 
bargaining period: Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), s 170N. Under the amendments 
brought in by the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth), the 
Commission will primarily have a conciliatory role in relation to industrial disputes. 
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It is submitted that the ability to take industrial action21 is integral to the fair 
operation of the process of collective bargaining at the federal level. In the absence of a 
mechanism for compulsory dispute resolution the parties are left with using their own 
level of bargaining power as a lever to attempt resolution of the dispute about the 
nature and contents of the proposed agreement. The ability to take industrial action to 
further one's own claims for the content of a certified agreement is an important tool in 
providing a balance between the bargaining power of employers and employees.22 As 
one commentator puts it, 'the power to bargain collectively is underpinned by the right 
to strike of employees.'23 Where one of the parties has little or no bargaining power, the 
collective bargaining process becomes inevitably a unilateral imposition of workplace 
terms and conditions.  
B  'Protected industrial action' 
Ordinarily, industrial action will constitute a breach of contract.24 Certain types of 
industrial action (such as picketing) may also breach other laws such as the tort of 
interference with contractual relations.25 There is also a range of statutory powers and 
penalties that may be used where industrial action is undertaken without the 
protection of the Act.26 One of the key features of the system of federal collective 
bargaining is the ability to take industrial action without fear of legal action by the 
other party ('protected industrial action').27 Industrial action will only be protected 
from legal action if it: 
• is taken for the purpose of supporting or advancing claims in the proposed 
agreement;  
• occurs after three days notice has been provided by the party engaging in 
industrial action;28 and  
• occurs during a bargaining period.    
Protected industrial action cannot be taken before the nominal expiry date of the 
current certified agreement.29   
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
21  Industrial action is defined broadly in the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 4, to include 
work bans or limitations, or the performance of work in a manner different from that in 
which it is customarily performed. This definition also appears in the Workplace Relations 
Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) s 106A. 
22  Paul Davies and Mark Freedland, Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law (3rd ed, 1983) 291–3. 
23  Steven Anderman, Labour Law: Management Decisions and Workers' Rights (2nd ed, 1993) 73. 
24  Creighton and Stewart, above n 9, [18.59]–[18.61].  
25  Ibid [18.66]–[18.83]. 
26  See Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 127, 170NC; Creighton and Stewart, above n 9, ch 
18; McCarry, above n 9; Di Felice, above n 9. Similar powers have been introduced by the 
Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth): ss 104, 111, 111A. 
27  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 170ML, 170MU. See further McCarry, above n 9. The 
Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) provides similar protection: ss 
108, 108L, 108M. 
28  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 170MO. The Workplace Relations Amendment (Work 
Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) has reproduced this requirement in s 108F. 
29  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 170MN. The Workplace Relations Amendment (Work 
Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) contains a similar provision in s 108E. 
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It can therefore be said that a feature of the federal system of collective bargaining 
is periods of industrial harmony during the life of an agreement followed by 
occasional industrial unrest whilst the parties flex their bargaining power in an attempt 
to persuade the other party to agree to their terms regarding the form and content of 
the next certified agreement. After an agreement is certified, the parties then settle into 
another period of industrial peace, because taking industrial action during the term of 
a certified agreement is unlawful.30  
II  THE UNCERTAINTY OF DIVERGING STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATIONS 
Industrial action usually has a significant impact on the parties involved in an 
industrial dispute, costing employers and employees lost productivity and money. It is 
therefore in the interests of all parties to a certified agreement that the ability to engage 
in and control industrial action during a bargaining period be as certain as possible. 
However, the last several years have been a time of considerable uncertainty 
concerning the scope of the certification process and, therefore, the ability to take 
protected industrial action under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). During this 
time there has been a stark divergence between two lines of authority in the Federal 
Court of Australia and the Commission.31 These two lines of authority diverge on the 
basis of what method of statutory interpretation should be employed when 
considering the provisions relating to certified agreements and protected industrial 
action. This article will refer to the two competing approaches as 'the holistic approach' 
and 'the specific approach'. The various stages of the Electrolux litigation demonstrate 
each of these approaches and, therefore, before considering the details of the 
conflicting authorities, it is necessary to say something of the facts involved in 
Electrolux. 
A  Facts in Electrolux32 
A number of unions had members employed by Electrolux, who were covered by a 
certified agreement with a nominal expiry date of 30 June 2001. During the period 
between April and September 2001 the unions and Electrolux attempted to form a new 
collective agreement. During the negotiations, Electrolux refused to formulate a new 
agreement with the unions on the basis of their request for the agreement to include: 
1. worksite access for union shop stewards; 
2. the establishment of a trust fund to ensure that employee entitlements could 
be met; and crucially 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
30  It is recognised that unlawful strikes have been a feature of industrial relations long before 
the creation of protected industrial action in 1993. However, these 'wildcat strikes' may be 
dealt with by obtaining an order from the Commission under the Workplace Relations Act 
1996 (Cth) s 127. See further McCarry, above n 9; Di Felice, above n 9. The Workplace 
Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) has moved the Commission's powers 
against industrial action into pt VC, div 6. 
31  See above n 16. 
32  This summary of the facts is based on an earlier article by the writer: see Jason Harris, 'The 
High Court Limits Protected Industrial Action' (2005) 57 Keeping Good Companies 42. 
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3. a requirement that Electrolux charge each non-union member employee an 
annual bargaining fee of $500 (which was greater than the price of union 
membership).33  
When Electrolux refused to accept these demands the unions gave notice of their 
intention to take industrial action. The unions assumed that because the workers were 
engaging in industrial action to further their claims in negotiating a new certified 
agreement the action would be protected. The unions' characterisation of the protected 
status of the industrial action was principally based on two arguments. First, the 
unions argued that even if any of the three claims were not matters pertaining to the 
relationship between employers and employees that did not mean that their inclusion 
in the proposed certified agreement prevented the agreement as a whole being so 
characterised. Secondly, as the workers were genuinely engaging in industrial action to 
further their negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, the action must be 
protected under the Act.  
Electrolux argued that the industrial action was not protected on the basis that the 
wording of s 170LI required every term of a proposed certified agreement to constitute 
a matter 'pertaining to the employment relationship'. If this argument were correct, 
then where the proposed agreement did contain a term not pertaining to the 
employment relationship, the parties could not take protected action during the 
negotiations for the proposed agreement. The reference to 'proposed agreement' in s 
170ML could not be construed as intending to confer protected status to industrial 
action in relation to a proposed agreement that would not be capable of certification 
under the Act. This interpretation drew heavily on the wording of s 170LH which 
provides, inter alia, that s 170LI sets out requirements that must be satisfied for the 
certification of agreements between employees or organisations of employees and 
constitutional corporations. It is now appropriate to consider how these claims were 
dealt with by the court.  
The unions were unsuccessful at trial with Merkel J finding that the bargaining fee 
clause did not pertain to the requisite relationship,34 which in his view prevented the 
proposed collective agreement from being certified because it did not meet the 
requirements of s 170LI.35 The consequence of this finding was that the industrial 
action taken by the unions and their members could not, in Merkel J's view, satisfy the 
requirements of s 170ML.36 On appeal, a Full Court of the Federal Court found that the 
mere fact that a proposed agreement contained some terms that did not pertain to the 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
33  It should be noted that prior to the High Court's decision the federal Parliament passed the 
Workplace Relations Amendment (Prohibition of Compulsory Union Fees) Act 2003 (Cth), which 
inserted s 298SA prohibiting unions from demanding a bargaining services fee outside of 
bargaining services contracts, and amended ss 170LU(2A) and 298Z(5)(b) to prevent the 
Commission from certifying an agreement that contains a bargaining services fee. These 
provisions have been retained in the freedom of association provisions under the 
renumbering done by the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth): see 
s 271(1)(e). Presumably the provision of a bargaining services fee will be prescribed as 
'prohibited content' under the new ss 101D–101F.  
34  Electrolux (FCA Merkel J) [2001] FCA 1600, [40]–[48]. 
35  Ibid [49]–[54]. 
36  Ibid [52]–[55]. 
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employment relationship of the parties (in this case the union bargaining fee clause) 
did not prevent the agreement from being certified, provided that the agreement as a 
whole could be said to be about matters pertaining to the relationship between the 
employer and its employees. The Full Court therefore found that the unions' industrial 
action was protected.37 On appeal from the Full Court, a majority of the High Court (6-
1) allowed the appeal and approved of Merkel J's reasoning on the requirements of s 
170LI and the consequent incapacity to take protected industrial action.38  
It is now appropriate to consider the differences in interpretive approach as 
demonstrated in the Electrolux cases. It is submitted that the decisions by Merkel J at 
trial and the majority in the High Court on appeal may be classified as applying a 
highly narrow specific approach, while the Full Court of the Federal Court and Kirby J 
in dissent may be classified as applying a holistic approach.39 
B  The holistic approach 
This line of authority assesses the agreement as a whole document, rather than 
requiring a specific analysis of each particular clause and is based on the perceived 
parliamentary intention of the legislative requirements for certification by the 
Commission (hereafter referred to as the 'holistic approach'). The holistic approach 
states that an agreement will be capable of certification provided that it can be 
characterised as a whole as being one that is 'about matters pertaining to the 
relationship between employers and employees'. That is, the holistic approach does not 
involve characterising each individual clause in a proposed agreement, but rather 
focuses on the general import of the agreement to assess compliance with s 170LI. The 
proponents of this approach draw support from the stated purposes of the Act,40 
expressed with an appreciation of the history of Australian industrial relations, 
particularly ambit claims and paper disputes. This construction therefore allows the 
parties greater scope to take protected industrial action because the range of 
agreements that may support such action will be broader than if the alternative 
interpretation is adopted. It is submitted that this result also provides for a fairer 
federal collective bargaining regime.  
The holistic approach is exemplified by the decision of the Full Bench of the 
Commission in Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries 
Union v Unilever Australia Ltd.41 In that case the Full Bench gave a lengthy judgment 
that sought to provide guidance on what it saw as the proper approach to interpreting 
s 170LI. The Full Bench stated that s 170LI describes 
an agreement about the relationship between real people, in actual work locations. It is 
necessary to ask rhetorically, why it is open, let alone necessary, to import into that 
description an added conceptual notion to justify a clause by clause analysis of the terms 
agreed for pertinence, to the relationship; or, (the expected answer may be more 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
37  Electrolux (FCFC) (2002) 118 FCR 177. 
38  Electrolux (2004) 209 ALR 116. 
39  As to the broad/narrow approaches to interpretation taken by the Federal Court in relation 
to outsourcing and transmission of business provisions, see Jason Harris, 'More 
Uncertainty for Outsourcing Arrangements' (2004) 56 Keeping Good Companies 36. 
40  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 3. 
41  (2003) 132 IR 34 ('Unilever'). 
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hesitant), a notional abstraction of the reference relationship, to make it between the 
persons, as employer, and as employee?42  
This passage indicates that in the view of the Full Bench in Unilever, the purpose 
underpinning the legislation (ie, flexibility in negotiating and agreeing on appropriate 
workplace terms and conditions) would be frustrated if the legislation imposed on 
employees the requirement to engage in a technical, legalistic process of definitively 
characterising each individual clause in the proposed agreement.  
The holistic approach has also been endorsed by obiter comments in the Full Court 
of the Federal Court decision in Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and 
Kindred Industries Union v Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd,43 which has since been 
overturned on appeal. In that case, the Full Court stated that an agreement should be 
characterised as a whole, rather than individually characterising each clause to see if it, 
as opposed to the whole of the agreement, pertained to the relationship between 
employers and employees.44 This approach was based on the phrase 'about matters 
pertaining…', which in the view of the Full Court meant that the agreement as a whole 
needed to be tested for compliance with s 170LI.45 In the Full Court's view, a certified 
agreement could still be said to be about matters pertaining to the relevant relationship 
even where it contained one or more clauses that in themselves did not pertain to that 
relationship.46 The Full Court was of the view that this interpretation fit within the 
stated purposes of the Act, to provide maximum choice and flexibility for workplace 
terms and conditions to be determined at the enterprise level, even if not formally 
provided for by the Act.47  
C  The specific approach 
The specific approach to interpreting the requirements for certification in pt VIB, and 
therefore the ability to take protected industrial action, involves interpreting the 
wording of the sections strictly without reference to the practical consequences of 
narrowly construing the operation of the provisions. This is based on the assumption 
that the Parliament has sufficiently demonstrated its intention through the choice of 
specific words in the enacted legislation, particularly in the continued use of legislative 
phrases that have a long-established judicially determined meaning. 
The decision that marks the beginning of the specific approach in the present 
context is the decision by Merkel J at first instance in the Electrolux trial.48 Merkel J 
found against Electrolux regarding the trust fund and shop stewards issues, but 
accepted that the industrial action taken by the employees was for the purpose of 
supporting the claims including the bargaining fee claim and, therefore, granted 
declarations that the industrial action was not protected. In his Honour's view, the 
bargaining fee claim was not a matter pertaining to the relationship between 
employers and employees because it established an agency relationship between the 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
42  Unilever (2003) 132 IR 34, 95 [161]. 
43  (2002) 118 FCR 177 ('Electrolux (FCFC)’). 
44  Electrolux (FCFC) (2002) 118 FCR 177, 196 [99]. 
45  Cf Electrolux (2004) 209 ALR 116, 122 [17] (Gleeson CJ).  
46  Electrolux (FCFC) (2002) 118 FCR 177, 196 [99]–[100]. 
47  Ibid 196 [101]. 
48  Electrolux (FCA Merkel J) [2001] FCA 1600. 
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unions and Electrolux.49 This analysis was based on the view that a requirement 
imposed on an employer to establish a pay deduction facility for the payment of the 
union fees (in this case a bargaining fee payable to the union) was analogous to the pay 
deduction of union dues, which had been held by the High Court not to pertain to the 
requisite relationship.50 The significance of his Honour's decision lies not in his 
characterisation of the nature of the bargaining fee,51 but rather in his view that the 
Commission was prevented from certifying an agreement that contained a clause that 
did not pertain to the requisite relationship.  
Merkel J stated that inclusion in the proposed agreement of a term that did not 
pertain to the requisite relationship, provided that the term was incidental or ancillary 
to a substantive term that did so pertain, did not prevent the agreement from being 
certified.52 However, if a substantive clause did not pertain to the requisite relationship 
then the agreement could not be said to be about matters pertaining to the requisite 
relationship.53 This strict interpretation (ie, that the Act requires every substantive 
aspect of the proposed agreement to pertain to the requisite relationship) has been 
almost overwhelmingly approved54 by the subsequent decisions of the Commission.55 
One particular decision that deserves comment is the decision in Re Atlas Steels,56 
where the Full Bench of the Commission considered the central issue of whether an 
agreement that contained terms that did not pertain to the requisite relationship could 
still be certified. The Full Bench found that the statutory effect of certified agreements 
(which may be enforceable as awards) meant that the scope of the matters dealt with in 
agreements, specifically whether the agreement could contain terms that did not 
pertain to the requisite relationship, should be limited to matters that do so pertain, 
just as awards must be about matters pertaining to the requisite relationship.57 More 
recently, the decision by Ross VP in Re KL Ballantyne & National Union Workers 
(Laverton Site) Agreement 200458 found that where a matter had been previously dealt 
with under an award the matter could be taken to satisfy the test in s 170LI. However, 
this contention probably does not survive later Full Bench authority, where it was held 
that the mere existence of an award including the same matter could not necessarily 
render the clause sufficient to comply with s 170LI.59 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
49  Ibid [41]. 
50  See R v Portus; Ex parte Australia & New Zealand Banking Group (1972) 127 CLR 353; Re Alcan 
Australia Ltd; Ex parte Federation of Industrial, Manufacturing and Engineering Employees (1994) 
181 CLR 96 ('Re Alcan Australia').  
51  This is because bargaining fees are now prohibited by statute: see above n 33. 
52  Electrolux (FCA Merkel J) [2001] FCA 1600, [50]. 
53  Ibid [51]. 
54  The Full Bench in Unilever (2003) 132 IR 34 is the notable exception. 
55  See Re Atlas Steels (2002) 114 IR 62; Transport Workers' Union of Australia v National Transport 
Operations Pty Ltd (2003) 121 IR 339; Re National Union of Workers (2003) 120 IR 438. 
56  (2002) 114 IR 62. 
57  Re Atlas Steels (2002) 114 IR 62; Transport Workers' Union of Australia v National Transport 
Operations Pty Ltd (2003) 121 IR 339, 343–4 [23]–[28]; Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 
4(1) (definition of industrial dispute), 89A.  
58  (unreported, AIRC, Ross VP, PR952656, 22 October 2004) ('Ballantyne'). 
59  Re Rural City of Murray Bridge Nursing Employees, ANF (Aged Care)-Enterprise Agreement 2004 
(2005) 142 IR 289 ('Schefenacker'), 307 [49]. 
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D  The High Court adopts the specific approach 
Prior to the High Court's decision in Electrolux the divergence in authority outlined 
above posed significant difficulties for parties involved in negotiations for certified 
agreements. In particular, the divergence in approaches created uncertainty regarding 
the proper scope and meaning of s 170LI, particularly: 
1. whether all of the substantive provisions in a certified agreement must be 
'about matters pertaining to the relationship between employers and 
employees'; and if not then 
2. how a certified agreement may be characterised as being 'about a matter 
pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees'; and  
3. the extent to which an insubstantial clause in a proposed agreement that does 
not pertain to the requisite relationship may prevent the agreement being 
certified.  
The High Court's decision has resolved some of this uncertainty. The High Court 
decided by a majority of 6-1 that the bargaining fee clause was not a 'matter pertaining 
to the relationship between employers and employees'.60 The majority overturned the 
Full Court's decision that protected action may be taken in respect of an agreement that 
contained terms not pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees. 
The High Court's decision took the form of a somewhat diverse range of four separate 
majority opinions, and a dissenting opinion given by Kirby J. 
1 Majority views 
The majority of the High Court agreed with Electrolux that the phrase 'proposed 
agreement' in the provisions conferring protected status on industrial action must refer 
to an agreement that is capable of certification under the Act (ie, an agreement that 
would comply with s 170LI). As the provisions regarding certification require the 
agreement to be about 'matters pertaining to the relationship between employers and 
employees', an agreement that contained terms that did not pertain to that relationship 
must not be an agreement for the purposes of pt VIB, div 2 and, therefore, cannot be 
certified. A consequence of this is that the agreement must also be incapable of 
supporting protected industrial action.61  
Gleeson CJ and McHugh J both found that all of the substantive terms in the 
agreement must pertain to the employment relationship for a number of reasons.62 
First, their Honours found that the Act does not allow for the certification of part of an 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
60  This conclusion was based on previous High Court decisions such as Re Alcan Australia 
(1994) 181 CLR 96, in which it was decided that the deduction of union dues by the 
employer was not a matter pertaining to the relationship between employers and 
employers, but rather between employers and unions. 
61  Electrolux (2004) 209 ALR 116, 120–6 [8]–[25] (Gleeson CJ), 141–8 [95]–[122] (McHugh J), 
154–9 [149]–[166] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), 177–180 [239]–[253] (Callinan J).  
62  Callinan J must be taken to have also accepted this point because his Honour stated that he 
preferred the approach of Merkel J to that of the Full Federal Court: Electrolux (2004) 209 
ALR 116, 177–8 [239]. The decision of Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ dealt primarily 
with the construction of s 170ML. 
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agreement.63 Secondly, their Honours stated that allowing certification of an 
agreement that contained substantial matters that did not pertain to the employment 
relationship would lead to practical difficulties in characterising the agreement.64 As 
Gleeson CJ stated:  
All the terms of an agreement ordinarily constitute part of the consideration flowing 
from one side or the other, and there is no way of knowing whether, or what, the parties 
would have agreed about the other terms if one term were excluded from the legal 
operation of the agreement. The argument appears to amount to the proposition that, if 
an agreement is mainly about the matters referred to in s 170LI, then the fact that it is 
partly about other matters as well is immaterial. In many cases, it will be impossible to 
say what an agreement is mainly about, but, in any event, there is no support, either in 
the text, or in the scheme of Pt VIB, for a conclusion that an agreement that is, in part, 
about matters other than the matters referred to in s 170LI may be a certified agreement. 
If it were otherwise, it is difficult to see any logical stopping place short of a proposition 
that an agreement would fall within the section if it contained even one term about the 
relevant matters.65 
The majority judgments also gave extensive consideration to the meaning of 
s 170ML. The tenor of the majority reasons is to the effect that protected action could 
not be taken over disputed agreements merely because the parties genuinely believed 
that the proposed agreement was capable of certification. The position is perhaps best 
put by Gleeson CJ who stated:  
The fact that parties to industrial action may be acting under a mistake of law as to 
whether a proposed agreement is of that nature is no more relevant to the protection 
given by s 170ML(2) than would be the fact that they neither knew nor cared whether 
the proposed agreement was of that nature. The protection conferred by s 170ML(2) is 
attracted by a combination of two circumstances: the purpose of supporting or 
advancing claims the subject of a proposed agreement; and the nature of the proposed 
agreement. The kind of proposed agreement being supported is not at large. It is not 
merely the fact of the proposal and support that is sufficient to gain protection; the 
nature of that which is proposed is also material.66 
The majority judgments also referred to s 170L which provides that the purpose of 
pt VIB is to facilitate the making of certified agreements. This was used as the basis for 
finding that protection for industrial action must therefore be limited under s 170ML to 
'action in support of agreements of the nature of the agreements with which pt VIB is 
concerned, that is to say, agreements of the kind identified in s 170LI.'67  
The majority judgments all include some discussion of the purposes of pt IVB. 
McHugh J specifically relied on the statutory purposes of the Act to support his 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
63  Ibid 122 [16] (Gleeson CJ), 142–3 [101] (McHugh J). 
64  Ibid 122 [17] (Gleeson CJ), 146 [110] (McHugh J). See also the reasons of Callinan J: ibid 181 
[253]. 
65  Ibid 122 [17] (Gleeson CJ). 
66  Ibid 124–5 [25] (Gleeson CJ). 
67  Ibid 124–5 [25] (Gleeson CJ). See similar comments at 146–8 [112]–[122] (McHugh J), 155–6 
[151]–[166] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), 178 [240] (Callinan J). 
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reasoning.68 His Honour stated that the reference in s 3 to employers and employees 
determining their agreement 'whether under the terms of this Act or not' meant that an 
agreement containing substantial non-pertaining terms could not be certified.69 
However, this view belies the range of significant difficulties that collective industrial 
agreements face outside of the provisions of the Act, which is discussed further below 
in Part III. 
2  Dissenting view 
Kirby J stressed the importance of interpreting legislation in accordance with its 
legislative purpose.70 His Honour sought to explain the provisions in light of the 
practical realities of modern industrial relations, specifically noting that pt VIB is based 
on the assumption that the parties will negotiate between themselves a new collective 
agreement.71 This satisfies the stated statutory purpose of the provisions outlined 
earlier in this article. If the Act requires negotiation to create a new collective 
agreement then that negotiation is likely to be characterised by a process of 
compromise, with each party making claims initially that they intend to water down as 
part of the bargaining process.72 Kirby J sought to protect the integrity of the 
bargaining process by ensuring that the protected status given to industrial action 
allowed the parties to engage in robust bargaining. His Honour stated that a failure to 
recognise the purpose of protected industrial action in giving parties the opportunity 
to exercise their economic bargaining power with some reasonable degree of certainty 
represented an unrealistic view of industrial negotiations.73 Furthermore, the 
consequence of adopting the specific approach to interpretation on the ability to take 
protected industrial action would create a chilling effect on the bargaining process.74 
His Honour dismissed the appeal on the basis that the industrial action should have 
been protected because the bargaining fee clause did not take the proposed agreement 
outside of the requirement that the agreement be 'about matters pertaining' to the 
relevant relationship. 
E  Which approach should prevail? 
In the writer's view, the holistic approach should be preferred to the specific approach 
on the basis that the former approach is better able to fulfil the objects of the statute. 
The Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA provides that, where there are various 
possible interpretations of a federal statute, 'a construction that would promote the 
purpose or object underlying the Act shall be preferred to a construction that would 
not promote that purpose or object.' Therefore, the holistic approach should be the 
preferable method of construction of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) because, in 
the writer's view, the specific approach fails to achieve the statutory purposes of the 
Act.  
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
68  Ibid 143–4 [102]–[105]. 
69  Ibid 143–4 [105] (McHugh J). 
70  Ibid 162 [182] (Kirby J). This is given statutory force by the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) 
s 15AA. 
71  Ibid 162 [187]. 
72  Ibid 163 [187]–[188]. 
73  Ibid 163–4 [190]. 
74  Ibid 164–5 [192]–[193]. 
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The holistic approach requires the parties to a proposed certified agreement to 
consider whether the agreement as a whole can be said to be 'about matters pertaining 
to the employment relationship'. It thereby relieves the parties from undertaking the 
process of legally characterising each clause within their proposed agreement to 
determine if, according to the prevailing High Court interpretation, each of the clauses 
is a 'matter pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees' in order 
to clarify their legal rights, which is what the specific approach requires. Admittedly, it 
was noted by McHugh J, who found for Electrolux, that the proposed agreement 
should be characterised as a whole.75 However, it is submitted that the practical effect 
of the majority views, particularly in light of Gleeson CJ's comments extracted above, 
renders a clause by clause analysis necessary in order to confirm compliance with s 
170LI.  
The problem with requiring a clause by clause analysis is that the process of 
characterisation is by no means simple or straightforward, but rather is a technical and 
complex assessment based on interpretations of prior authorities. If the purpose of the 
Act is to provide the optimum level of flexibility in the determination of workplace 
terms and conditions,76 then the Act should be interpreted in a manner that will fulfil 
those statutory objects. This would mean providing a legal framework that actually 
facilitates agreement between employers and employees. The specific approach, 
however, places unreasonable demands on the parties, particularly in a non-union 
agreement under s 170LK, where the capacity of employees to engage in an accurate 
legal characterisation of each clause, in the absence of the legal support of a union, 
must be doubted. The difficulty lies in the requirement to engage in clause by clause 
analysis rather than a whole of agreement characterisation. It would be far easier for 
the parties to a certified agreement to examine the instrument as a whole and 
determine whether that agreement is about matters pertaining to the relevant 
relationship than to characterise each clause.77  
As discussed above, the ability to engage in genuine collective bargaining requires 
some form of counterbalance to the bargaining powers of the parties. In the federal 
system of collective bargaining the primary counterbalance is the right to take 
protected industrial action. However, the specific approach restricts this right by 
narrowing the scope of permissible certified agreements. The holistic approach is 
designed to facilitate the legitimate use of industrial action as a lawful bargaining tactic 
within the context of negotiating new certified agreements. The aim of the holistic 
approach is to provide employers and employees with a high degree of certainty 
regarding their bargaining powers so that the parties have confidence in asserting their 
rights. In a system that depends upon enterprise level dispute resolution, the parties 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
75  Ibid 143 [102]. 
76  Australian Paper Ltd v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy and Allied Services Union 
of Australia (1998) 81 IR 15, 18 (North J); cited with approval in the dissenting opinion of 
Kirby J in Electrolux (2004) 209 ALR 116, 162 [185].  
77  It is submitted that the changes brought about by the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work 
Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) will not remove this difficulty because the new provisions will still 
require a clause by clause analysis to determine whether any of the clauses falls within the 
boundaries of 'prohibited content', although it is hoped that the definition of prohibited 
content under the (as yet unpublished) Workplace Relations Regulations may be more easily 
applied than the meaning of a 'matter pertaining to the employment relationship'. 
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should be able to exercise their bargaining power without facing the threat of penalties 
being levied for technical errors in legally characterising the proposed agreement, 
particularly when that process 'may be a matter about which well-informed people 
have different views'.78  
The use of the specific approach creates unnecessary uncertainty and complexity in 
the collective bargaining process. Limiting the power to engage in protected industrial 
action has the practical effect of distorting the balance of bargaining power between 
the parties and thereby reducing the flexibility given to the parties to genuinely agree as 
to what they consider to be the most appropriate form of agreement to regulate their 
workplace terms and conditions. This result goes against the stated purposes of the 
Act.  
It could be argued that the right to take protected industrial action should be 
limited because of the negative impact that strikes have on innocent third parties (eg, 
suppliers and customers). However, the force of this claim must be viewed in light of 
the fact that the prevalence of industrial action in Australia is declining.79 Furthermore, 
the Act currently provides scope for the Commission to terminate the protected status 
of industrial action by suspending or terminating the bargaining period operating 
between the parties.80 While it is accepted that these measures cannot currently be 
initiated by affected third parties, the harm caused to individual third parties should 
not be a decisive factor in relation to the question of whether industrial action should 
be protected.81 There are a number of reasons to support this, including the prior 
notice provisions required for taking protected industrial action which allow third 
parties some time to anticipate disruptions and thereby alleviate their impact.82 
Furthermore, the most disruptive aspect of industrial action for third parties — that is 
picketing — is not generally covered by the protections of the Act.83 Lastly, as 
Professors Creighton and Stewart point out, there is ample scope for parties whose 
interests have been affected by industrial action to apply for an interlocutory 
injunction, on the basis that the industrial action should not be protected. There are a 
range of issues that can invalidate protected action,84 and the applicant for an 
interlocutory injunction need only establish a serious question to be tried and that the 
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78  Electrolux (FCFC) (2002) 118 FCR 177, 195 [93]; Bluescope Steel Ltd v Communications, 
Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of 
Australia (2005) 137 IR 115 ('Bluescope Steel'), 119–120 [22]; Pacific National (ACT) Pty Limited 
v Australian Rail, Tram & Bus Industry Union [2005] FCA 1383, [13]. 
79  Australian Bureau of Statistics figures indicate that the number of industrial disputes and 
the number of days lost to industrial disputes has been in decline for the last several years: 
Industrial Disputes Australia, 17 March 2005, 6321.0.55.001. 
80  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 170MW. The Workplace Relations Amendment (Work 
Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) also contains numerous grounds to suspend or terminate a 
bargaining period: ss 107G–107J.  
81  It should be noted that the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) has 
introduced the power to suspend or terminate a bargaining period if the industrial action 
taken during the bargaining period threatens to cause significant harm to a third person: s 
107J. 
82  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 170MO. 
83  David's Distribution Pty Ltd v National Union of Workers (1999) 91 FCR 463. 
84  Creighton and Stewart, above n 9, [18.86]. 
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balance of convenience favours granting the injunction.85 Therefore it is submitted that 
third party rights are already adequately protected under the current regime and 
would not suffer unfair prejudice by the adoption of a broad holistic approach to ss 
170LI and 170ML.  
III  PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE MAJORITY'S RULING IN 
ELECTROLUX  
In addition to doctrinal problems arising from the majority of the High Court's 
adoption of the specific approach, there are also substantial practical problems caused 
by the majority decision in Electrolux. Despite the diversity of opinions contained in the 
High Court's Electrolux decision, this much seems to be settled:86 
• Protected industrial action cannot be undertaken in pursuit of an agreement 
that contains a substantive clause that does not pertain to the requisite 
relationship;  
• A certified agreement cannot be registered by the Commission if it contains a 
substantive clause that does not pertain to the requisite relationship; and 
• An agreement can still be certified, and protected action can be undertaken in 
pursuit of the proposed agreement, provided that any terms that do not 
pertain to the requisite relationship are merely incidental or ancillary to 
substantive provisions that do so pertain or are mere machinery provisions.87 
If an agreement cannot be certified where it contains substantive terms that do not 
meet the requirements of s 170LI, then as the Full Bench of the Commission has noted, 
'it would seem to follow that if the Commission purports to certify an agreement 
containing a provision of that kind the agreement will have no legal effect under the 
Act.'88 Thus, the practical effect of the majority's specific approach to interpreting 
s 170LI is not only to make the process of certification more complex, to limit the 
availability of statutory rights to take protected industrial action, but also (and perhaps 
this is the most concerning aspect of the decision) to leave agreements certified by the 
Commission lingering under a continuous cloud of uncertainty. The uncertainty arises 
because if, at any time during the life of the agreement, the parties come before the 
Commission to resolve a dispute over the application of the agreement using the 
private arbitration function commonly conferred on the Commission under most 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
85  Ibid [18.81]. See, eg, John Holland Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union 
(2005) 144 IR 418. 
86  Ballantyne (unreported, AIRC, Ross VP, PR952656, 22 October 2004) [9]; Schefenacker (2005) 
142 IR 289, 306–8 [45]–[50].  
87  It should be noted that this last point has the potential to be used very broadly, which is 
why the Full Bench of the Commission in Schefenacker (2005) 142 IR 289, 299–300 [19], said 
that care should be used when applying the descriptions of incidental and ancillary to 
particular clauses. 
88  Schefenacker (2005) 142 IR 289, 307–8 [50], citing Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597, 614–5 [51] (Gleeson CJ), which in turn cites 
numerous authorities for the proposition that decisions made under a jurisdictional error 
have no legal effect. 
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certified agreements,89 one of the parties may well seek to object to the Commission's 
jurisdiction. An objection to jurisdiction may be made on the basis that the 
Commission should never have registered the agreement because it contained one or 
more substantive matters that did not pertain to the requisite relationship; thus the 
agreement (and hence the power to resolve the dispute) would be a legal nullity.90 A 
prerogative writ may well lie against the decision of a Commissioner either to proceed 
with the private arbitration (in which case prohibition may be sought to prevent the 
arbitration from proceeding) or to decline to proceed (in which case mandamus may be 
sought to require the Commissioner to perform the arbitration). An application may 
also be made to the Federal Court of Australia seeking a declaration to clarify the legal 
status of the certified agreement.91  
The continuing uncertainty caused by Electrolux would not be welcomed by either 
employers or employees and has led to the Full Bench of the Commission recently 
stating:  
Given the difficulties in characterisation which have arisen, and the likelihood that 
similar difficulties will arise in the future, the Parliament may think it appropriate to give 
consideration to a legislative amendment which might give a greater degree of certainty 
to the legal operation of an agreement once it has been certified.92 
It is unfortunate that this problem was not resolved by the Parliament when it 
enacted the Workplace Relations Amendment (Agreement Validation) Act 2004 (Cth), as 
discussed in the next section.93  
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
89  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 170LT(8), 170LW. As to the nature of the Commission's 
private arbitration function see Carolyn Sutherland, 'By Invitation Only: The Role of the 
AIRC in Private Arbitration' (2005) 18 Australian Journal of Labour Law 53; Andrew Stewart, 
'The AIRC's Evolving Role in Policing Bargaining' (2004) 17 Australian Journal of Labour Law 
245.   
90  It should be noted that Heerey J recently refused an application for an interlocutory 
injunction based on the argument that the notice initiating the bargaining period was void 
because it referred to a matter that did not pertain to the employment relationship: 
Bluescope Steel (2005) 137 IR 115, 118–120 [15]–[23]. However, in Finance Sector Union of 
Australia v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2005] FCA 796, Merkel J found that an 
agreement that had been certified by the Commission was invalid under the Act because 
the agreement allowed for operational terms external to the agreement. His Honour found 
that the Commission's certification was void and that the agreement therefore operated as a 
common law contract (which his Honour found to be in breach of the freedom of 
association provisions in Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) pt XA).  
91  Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B(1A)(c), which speaks of any matters arising under federal 
law. The High Court has found that the same phrase used in s 76(ii) of the Constitution 
applies if the rights or duties in question owe their existence to federal law, or depend 
upon federal law for their enforcement: R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration; Ex parte Barrett (1945) 70 CLR 141, 154 (Latham CJ). Thus, as the function of the 
Commission in private arbitration depends upon s 170LW for its enforcement, the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Court under the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B(1A)(c) should be 
enlivened.  
92  Schefenacker (2005) 142 IR 289, 307–8 [50]. 
93  The Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Inquiry into Workplace Relations Amendment (Agreement Validation) Bill (2004) did 
not address this issue. See further Marilyn Pittard, 'Agreements Straying Beyond 
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In addition to this unacceptable state of continuing uncertainty, it is also submitted 
that the High Court's majority decision raises several further unresolved problems: 
1. What is the status of certified agreements already registered and industrial 
action taken prior to the Electrolux decision?  
2. When can a proposed agreement which contains a non-pertaining clause still 
be registered?  
3. Is it possible for the parties to enter into a legally enforceable non-certified 
agreement in relation to matters that are incapable, in light of the Electrolux 
decision, of being certified by the Commission?  
A  The effect of Electrolux on pre-existing agreements and prior industrial action 
The High Court's decision in Electrolux threw into doubt the validity of many existing 
certified agreements that contained substantive provisions that might not satisfy the 
Court's interpretation of the requirements of s 170LI. The federal Parliament responded 
by passing the Workplace Relations Amendment (Agreement Validation) Act 2004 (Cth), 
which came into effect on 15 December 2004.94 This Act amended the Workplace 
Relations Act 1996 (Cth) so that certified agreements existing, and protected industrial 
action taken, before 2 September 2004 (the date of the Electrolux decision) would not be 
invalidated (in the case of an agreement) or rendered unprotected (in the case of 
industrial action), merely because of the High Court's decision.95 The legislation did 
not, however, deal with agreements or industrial action after that date and, therefore, 
problems of uncertainty continue to arise in relation to the certification of agreements 
and the taking of industrial action after 2 September 2004. The problems caused by this 
continuing uncertainty have been noted above.    
B How to characterise a clause as 'incidental, ancillary or mere machinery' 
A proposed certified agreement that contains a clause that does not pertain to the 
requisite relationship may still be properly registered by the Commission if the clause 
is: 96 
• ancillary or incidental to a substantive matter that does so pertain to the 
employment relationship; 
• merely a machinery provision; or 
• not intended to affect legal rights or impose obligations upon the parties.97 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Employment Matters: The Impact of the Agreement Validation Matters Legislation' (2005) 
18 Australian Journal of Labour Law 71. 
94  For a detailed discussion of the validation legislation see Pittard, ibid. 
95  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 170NHA–170NHC. The agreements are validated to 
the extent that they do not contain matters that do not pertain to the employment 
relationship.  
96  Electrolux (FCA Merkel J) [2001] FCA 1600, [50] (affirmed (2004) 209 ALR 116, 122 [17] 
(Gleeson CJ), 141 [95]–[96], 143 [103] (McHugh J); not considered by other members of the 
court); Re Atlas Steels (2002) 114 IR 62, 68 [23]; Unilever (2003) 132 IR 34, 85 [126]; Ballantyne 
(unreported, AIRC, Ross VP, PR952656, 22 October 2004) [33]–[47]; Schefenacker (2005) 142 
IR 289, 307 [47]. See also Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 ('Industrial Relations 
Act Case'), which took a similar position in relation to award matters. 
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There has been an extraordinary number of cases in the Commission that have 
considered this issue, and it is difficult to identify a unifying principle from these 
decisions. However, something that may be confidently stated is that the 
characterisation of each clause depends very much upon its particular wording rather 
than some general notion about matters that have or have not been held to pertain to 
the employment relationship in the past. Thus, the mere fact that a matter has been 
previously dealt with by an award will not solely determine that the matter pertains to 
the employment relationship in the proposed agreement.98 Similarly, the mere fact that 
a proposed clause benefits a union will not prevent the clause, if worded 
appropriately, from being characterised as a matter pertaining to the employment 
relationship.99  
C  Examples of typical problems 
In order to demonstrate the problems resulting from the Electrolux decision it is 
appropriate to consider two types of clauses commonly included in certified 
agreements, namely right of entry clauses and contracting limitation clauses. The point 
of discussing these two types of clauses is that the legal status of these clauses differs 
markedly depending upon the wording of the clause and, in some situations, upon 
which member of the Commission hears the certification application. It should also be 
noted that the federal government could prohibit these two types of clauses from 
appearing in workplace agreements following the changes made by the Workplace 
Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth).100  
1  Rights of entry 
Clauses that confer rights on union officials to enter workplaces to discuss matters 
with employees who are members of the union have been a long-time feature of 
Australian industrial instruments. Indeed, the Act itself provides for limited rights of 
entry for union officials.101 The clause by clause characterisation process required by 
the majority's decision in Electrolux means that a clause in an agreement that gives a 
union official a right of entry must be examined to determine whether it is a matter 
pertaining to the employment relationship. However, parties who wish to include such 
a clause in a proposed agreement face the difficulty of establishing a clear line of 
authority in the industrial courts and tribunals as to when a right of entry clause may 
be characterised as being a matter pertaining to the employment relationship. For 
example, in Wesfarmers Premier Coal Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
97  Electrolux (2004) 209 ALR 116, 122 [17] (Gleeson CJ); Ballantyne (unreported, AIRC, Ross VP, 
PR952656, 22 October 2004), [48]; Schefenacker (2005) 142 IR 289, 299–300 [19]. 
98  Schefenacker (2005) 142 IR 289, 307 [49]; cf Ballantyne (unreported, AIRC, Ross VP, PR952656, 
22 October 2004).  
99  Ballantyne (unreported, AIRC, Ross VP, PR952656, 22 October 2004) [58].  
100  If this were to occur, the issue would then focus on whether the term included fits within 
the scope of the prohibited term. In which case the difficulties discussed below concerning 
the overly technical nature of the legal requirements relating to agreement would still 
apply. 
101  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), pt IX. See further William Ford, 'Being There: Changing 
Union Rights of Entry under Federal Industrial Law' (2000) 13 Australian Journal of Labour 
Law 1. 
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and Kindred Industries Union (No 2),102 French J found that limiting the operation of the 
proposed right of entry clause to situations that would come within the scope of the 
statutory right in pt IX of the Act, and no more, was not a matter pertaining to the 
employment relationship. Rather, it could be classed as being ancillary to other 
provisions in the agreement that were matters pertaining to the employment 
relationship.103 However, in the subsequent Full Bench decision in Re Rural City of 
Murray Bridge Nursing Employees, ANF (Aged Care)-Enterprise Agreement 2004,104 
('Schefenacker' as it has been widely referred to by the media), it was held that 'disputes 
about the operation of the various provisions of Part IX are unlikely to be disputes 
about matters that pertain to the relevant relationship.'105 
In Ballantyne, Ross VP considered a right of entry clause allowing union officials 
rights to interview employees. It was held that the clause could be classed as being 
incidental or ancillary to other clauses in the agreement that were matters pertaining to 
the employment relationship. This was because the ability to investigate and speak to 
workers about compliance with the certified agreement allowed for a more effective 
settlement of the dispute between the workers and the employer and should therefore 
be permitted.106 
The subsequent Full Bench decision in Schefenacker provided a reasonably clear test 
for determining whether a right of entry clause could be said to be a matter pertaining 
to the employment relationship: 
A right of entry which is confined to entry for the purposes of investigating and securing 
compliance with any relevant award, applicable agreement or other matters that pertain 
to the relations between employers and employees as such may be included in an 
agreement. A right of entry which is unconfined is capable of being exercised for 
purposes extraneous to the employment relationship. A right of entry of the latter kind 
might be used for the purpose of campaigning for union elections or for the purpose of 
raising the political awareness of union members in relation to a current political issue. It 
follows, in our view, that a right of entry confined in the fashion we have indicated may 
be included in an agreement that satisfies the requirements of s 170LI.107 
These comments were considered by O'Callaghan SDP, who found that a right of 
entry clause which provided the power to enter in order to 'interview' workers, 
without specifying exactly what the workers could be interviewed about, could not be 
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102  (2004) 138 IR 362 ('Wesfarmers'). 
103  Wesfarmers (2004) 138 IR 362, 390 [110]–[112]. Cf Country Fire Authority v United Firefighters' 
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104  (2005) 142 IR 289. 
105  Schefenacker (2005) 142 IR 289, 330 [116]. 
106  Ballantyne (unreported, AIRC, Ross VP, PR952656, 22 October 2004) [179]–[214]. 
107  Schefenacker (2005) 142 IR 289, 331 [119]. 
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incidental or ancillary on the basis that the power was capable of being used for 
purposes outside of the employment relationship.108 
However, a more recent, but differently constituted Full Bench, took this issue 
further by finding that a right of entry clause contained in a proposed agreement could 
be a matter pertaining to the employment relationship provided that the clause was 
expressly limited by the agreement to 'legitimate purposes'. Such a phrase should be 
construed as referring to the matters mentioned by the earlier Full Bench in 
Schefenacker, which are extracted above.109  
Therefore, one of the practical problems that Electrolux has caused is that it is 
difficult for the parties to obtain certainty regarding the legal status of their proposed 
agreement because of the various interpretations of 'matters pertaining to the 
employment relationship' that are being adopted by each decision. There is simply no 
clear line of consistent authority, even on something as relatively basic as when a 
union official may or may not enter the workplace.  
2 Contracting limitations 
Clauses that seek to limit an employer's use of contract labour provide another good 
example of the difficulties that result from adopting the specific approach. It could be 
said that the regulation of an employer's use of contract labour is a borderline issue 
which could in some circumstances be found to be a matter not pertaining to the 
employment relationship, while in other contexts the matter may pertain to the 
employment relationship. Thus, it has been held that a blanket limitation on the use of 
contract labour is not a matter pertaining to the employment relationship.110 While in 
other cases, it has been held that regulating the use of contract labour may be a matter 
pertaining to the employment relationship if the manner of regulation has a direct 
connection with the employment security of the workers covered by the agreement.111  
The difference in outcome is directly determined by the different wording of the 
proposed agreement and the linking of the matter to the workplace terms and 
conditions of the employees covered by the agreement, for example by requiring that 
contract workers are engaged on terms and conditions no less favourable than offered 
by the proposed agreement. However, an examination of the cases on this issue reveals 
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108  Re South Pacific Tyres Retreading (Windsor Gardens) Enterprise Agreement 2004 (unreported, 
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that this is a very fine and often difficult distinction to make, allowing the parties to 
easily fall into error and thereby prevent the agreement from being certified.  
In Schefenacker, the Full Bench found that a clause which directed the employer to 
instruct labour hire agencies to pay their workers under the same wage rates as 
applied under the certified agreement was a matter pertaining to the employment 
relationship, or was at least an aspirational clause that did not confer a substantive 
obligation on the employer and, therefore, did not prevent the agreement from being 
certified.112 Whereas in another case, a clause which provided that '[c]asual employees 
engaged by a Labour Hire Company working in a position covered under this 
agreement shall be employed on the same wages and conditions as applies to a [casual 
engaged directly by the employer]' was found to be an attempt to make a non-party to 
the agreement (ie, the labour hire company) bound by the agreement and, therefore, 
was not a matter pertaining to the employment relationship.113 The most recent line of 
decisions has determined that any determination of the circumstances in which 
contractors may be utilised by the employer (for example, 'contractors may only be 
used to cover peak demands for labour'), even where the purpose of such prescription 
is to enhance the security of employment for the workers covered by the agreement, 
will prevent the agreement from being certified because it contains a matter that does 
not pertain to the employment relationship.114 The clear difficulty involved in this area 
is the fact that both clauses attempt to achieve the same goal, that is, regulating the cost 
of labour so that the employment security of the workers covered by the proposed 
agreement is not jeopardised. However, the differences in the wordings of the clauses 
can render the entire agreement incapable of certification and render industrial action 
taken in support of the clause unprotected. As one commentator has recently noted, 
the determination of whether an agreement complies with the Act largely depends on 
how the clauses are drafted, rather than the nature of the subject matter covered by the 
clauses.115  
One thing is made demonstrably clear by the cases considered above in relation to 
rights of entry and contracting clauses, and that is that parties negotiating certified 
agreements are forced, because of the specific approach endorsed by the majority in 
Electrolux, to walk a very fine and often shifting line between clauses whose wording 
will satisfy the requirements of s 170LI and those that will not. Unfortunately for the 
parties the legal position only becomes clearer once the Commission actually considers 
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the agreement for certification.116 It would appear that the majority's decision in 
Electrolux has done little more than ensure the need for extensive litigation to 
determine what wording is more likely to be accepted in relation to each type of 
clause.117 
3  Identifying incidental, ancillary or machinery provisions  
It is submitted that the following comments provide a useful framework for assisting 
with the characterisation of a clause as incidental or ancillary to a substantive clause 
that does pertain to the requisite relationship: 
[A] clause in an agreement can properly be regarded as incidental to another if it has a 
rational and natural tendency to affect the operation of that other clause in a manner that 
is direct as opposed to consequential or remote.118  
A clause in a proposed agreement is unlikely to be characterised as incidental, 
ancillary or machinery in nature where it contains a high level of prescribed conduct so 
that the clause can be said to stand adequately on its own.119 On this basis there would 
appear to be little scope for parties negotiating a new certified agreement to attempt to 
include any significant matters that are at risk of not pertaining to the requisite 
relationship in the new agreement, in the hope that the clause will be accepted by the 
Commission as incidental, ancillary or merely machinery in nature. However, this 
point is far from clear as Ross VP has recently given the term 'ancillary' a very broad 
meaning. In Ballantyne, Ross VP noted in obiter comments that 'ancillary' could refer to 
'a means of making a substantive provision effective'.120 Furthermore, Ross VP rejected 
a submission from the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry that any 
ancillary or incidental provision needs to be linked directly to a substantive provision 
that does pertain to the employment relationship.121 It is submitted that this view may 
not survive more recent authority.122 
This then leaves parties negotiating a new certified agreement with the option of 
pursuing the non-pertaining matters in a common law contract. However, it is 
submitted that this alternative is fraught with problems of legal principle which may, 
in many workplace situations, be insurmountable, leaving the parties with no legal 
method of regulating and enforcing certain aspects of their collective relationship. This 
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116  The Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) will exacerbate this 
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hardly seems to conform to the stated purpose of the Act to provide flexibility in 
entering into the most appropriate form of industrial agreement.123 
D Is there scope for unregistered agreements? 
The comment has been made in several recent cases that where a clause in a proposed 
agreement cannot be included in the agreement submitted to the Commission for 
registration, then the parties should deal with the matter according to the general 
law.124 However, the enforceability of unregistered collective agreements is an area of 
industrial law plagued by uncertainty.125 The range of difficulties that arise in relation 
to enforcing unregistered agreements as legally binding contracts relate to problems 
with the legal status and powers of trade unions, and also to problems of uncertainty, 
lack of contractual intention and absence of consideration.  
Many of the difficulties with the enforceability of unregistered agreements concern 
the uncertainty regarding the proper legal status of registered trade unions. For 
example, if a trade union is a party principal to a certified agreement under s 170LJ, the 
Act provides a framework where all of the potentially affected workers are given an 
opportunity to vote on the proposed collective agreement, and (provided the vote 
achieves the required majority) all of the current and future workers are bound.126 The 
great benefit of registration and enforcement of collective agreements under the Act is 
the ability to achieve uniformity and consistency through binding dissenting workers. 
The same cannot be said of unregistered agreements between employers and unions at 
common law. At common law, although a registered union is a body corporate with 
the power to enter into contracts in its own right,127 the powers of trade unions are 
limited by the scope of their internal rules,128 which gives rise to doubts that trade 
unions have the power to enter into valid contracts outside of the scope and purposes 
of the Act.129  
Aside from problems concerning the capacity of trade unions to enter into 
industrial contracts outside of the Act, unregistered agreements are also problematic 
because of the union's potential inability to enforce compliance with the terms of the 
contract on the entire workforce.130 The fundamental problem is that the union cannot 
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123  One counter argument to this, although outside the scope of this article, is that it is 
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be said to be the authorised agent for non-members131 and, therefore, does not have 
the power to bind non-members to their unregistered agreements made with the 
employer. The historically low levels of current union membership in the private 
sector mean that it is likely that in many workplaces a union will not represent even a 
majority of the workforce. Employers are unlikely to support an agreement that does 
not apply equally to their entire workforce or, at least, equally to certain distinct 
sections of the workforce. It is more likely that such problems will result in employers 
refusing to enter into unregistered agreements unless the workers unanimously 
support the agreement, thereby requiring a contract not with the union but with the 
individual workers. It would be highly unlikely that the unregistered collective 
agreement could be simply incorporated into each individual worker's contract of 
employment.132 Therefore, the workers would need to agree as a group to enter into 
the contract with the employer which would require uniformity of opinion in the 
workforce that is simply unrealistic. Even assuming that the workers could 
unanimously agree on a contract with their employer, they may feel uneasy about 
entering into a contract with their employer personally, particularly if the agreement 
imposes mutual obligations on the parties. If the parties attempt to draft the agreement 
in very broad terms so that the agreement can achieve unanimous support, the 
agreement risks becoming void for uncertainty or lacking the intention to create legal 
relations.133 
The changing body of persons that make up the workforce for a particular 
employer poses equally difficult problems for making unregistered agreements 
common law contracts.134 Suppose that an unregistered agreement were in place with 
all of the workers of a particular employer, how would changes be made to the 
contract? Amendments to the contract may be needed as each employee leaves the 
employer's workforce and as each new employee enters the workplace, which would 
impose a significant administrative burden on the employer. It might be argued that 
the employer could be bound by the contract to only offer new employment on the 
condition that each new employee agrees to the terms of the contract, although this 
raises the possibility of the contract being an unreasonable restraint of trade.135  
It may be thought that this problem could be resolved by drafting the contract in 
the broadest terms possible so that such changes are unnecessary. However, a lack of 
particularity in a contract would be likely to render the contract, or at least parts of it, 
void for uncertainty. It may well be that some uncertifiable terms (particularly those 
that express vague intentions or aspirations of the parties) are inherently uncertain and 
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could not be included in any enforceable contract.136 However, there is some support 
for the view that broad aspirational terms that are not intended to create legally 
binding obligations may be included in a valid certified agreement.137   
There is also the further problem of agreement fragmentation, especially in light of 
the furore surrounding the Emwest litigation.138 The Full Court of the Federal Court's 
decision in Emwest affirmed the earlier trial decision by Kenny J, which provided that 
where a certified agreement did not comprehensively cover all issues that may arise 
between the employer and its workers, the workers could take protected industrial 
action in support of claims that were not covered by the agreement (in that case 
redundancy benefits). This has led to agreements now commonly including whole of 
agreement clauses to prevent any further issues outside of the scope of the agreement 
allowing protected action to be taken.139 Herein lies the practical difficulty with the 
Electrolux decision. The Electrolux decision means that registered agreements can only 
deal with certain matters, which may result in impermissible matters continuing to 
cause industrial disharmony, although the threat of lawful industrial action is reduced 
by the narrow interpretation of protected action used by the Court.140 One benefit of 
registered industrial agreements is that they provide certainty for employers who can 
rely on the industrial peace that should be obtained during the term of the registered 
agreement. Therefore, if the parties to a certified agreement wish to make an 
unregistered agreement in resolution of a dispute over matters that cannot be included 
in the certified agreement because of the Electrolux ruling (for example broad based 
contracting bans), they may face problems because the certified agreement will need to 
include a whole of agreement clause to avoid the Emwest problem, which would 
thereby render the unregistered contract unenforceable.141  
Perhaps a resolution could be to draft the whole of agreement clause so as to limit 
its operation to matters pertaining to the requisite relationship. It is imperative, 
however, that the unregistered agreement not attempt to alter the terms of the certified 
agreement.  Nor could it attempt to impose further burdens on the parties following 
the recent decision in McLennan v Surveillance Australia Pty Ltd,142 where Black CJ and 
Moore J found that an attempt to vary an AWA by way of an unregistered agreement 
had no legal effect. This was because their Honours held that the legislature could not 
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have intended to create a system whereby parties could freely bargain to reach an 
agreement governing the matters pertaining to their employment relationship, and in 
so doing remove any award or certified agreement protection,143 but also allow that 
bargain to be altered by an unregulated and unregistered collateral contract.144 The 
provisions governing the effect and variation of AWAs considered by the Full Court of 
the Federal Court are, for present purposes, identical to the provisions that apply in 
relation to certified agreements, which means there is no reason to limit the reasoning 
in McLennan from operating in relation to certified agreements. Furthermore, in the 
recent decision in Finance Sector Union v Commonwealth Bank of Australia,145 Merkel J 
held that an agreement certified by the Commission which contained a clause allowing 
the agreement to be added to by a collateral contract resulted in a failure to provide all 
of the terms of the agreement for certification, which rendered the entire agreement 
incapable of certification. Thus, the proposition that any non-pertaining matter that is 
excluded from the certified agreement because of the Electrolux case can simply be 
included in a common law contract must be doubted.146 
Finally, unregistered agreements may be unenforceable because they lack 
consideration, although this may be overcome through the use of a deed. There also is 
authority for the view that the peace obligation given by the workers or the union will 
constitute sufficient consideration to support the contract.147  
Therefore, it can be said that there seems to be no easy way for parties to a certified 
agreement to create an enforceable collective common law agreement dealing with 
matters that do not comply with the Electrolux interpretation of s 170LI without giving 
rise to a number of legal uncertainties.  
IV CONCLUSION  
It is submitted that the majority in Electrolux took an unduly narrow view of what may 
constitute an 'agreement' under pt VIB, div 2 of the Act, without sufficient regard being 
paid to the practical difficulties that are likely to be caused by the decision. The 
immediate effect is that employees and, if applicable, their unions, must engage in a 
time consuming, legal analysis of each clause in any proposed agreement to determine 
whether all of the substantive clauses may be characterised as pertaining to the 
requisite relationship. In situations where the parties can afford proper legal advice, 
this process might not be too difficult. However, with union membership at 
historically low levels of less than 20 per cent in the private sector, for groups of 
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unrepresented employees or small businesses with no experience in industrial law, this 
will prove virtually impossible or at best very costly.148 For parties without the 
sufficient resources and expertise to effectively determine the legal character of 
particular clauses, the threat of penalties and common law action will hang like the 
sword of Damocles above their heads. The result will be that any clauses that have any 
element of doubt regarding whether they pertain to the requisite relationship will be 
dropped from the agreement, otherwise the parties will be prevented from taking 
industrial action altogether. This situation cannot be said to be the preferable 
construction of the Act, given that it does not seem to achieve the statutory purposes. 
It is submitted that the holistic approach to interpreting the requirements of pt VIB 
offers the best method of maintaining regulatory neutrality between the parties 
involved in industrial negotiations. The narrow interpretation adopted by the 'specific 
approach' discussed above increases the complexity of federal collective bargaining149 
and discourages the use of otherwise legitimate bargaining techniques to genuinely 
settle actual or potential industrial disputes by dealing with all of the issues deemed 
important by the parties. The right to engage in protected industrial action underpins 
the integrity of the system of collective bargaining by evening up the bargaining power 
of the parties.150 A restriction of the right to engage in protected industrial action only 
increases the bargaining power of the economically stronger bargaining party, and 
thereby further skews the likely outcomes of the bargaining to that party's favour. This 
seems inconsistent in a workplace bargaining system that has the goal of leaving the 
determination of workplace terms and conditions to employers and employees, subject 
to the minimum award safety net. The Electrolux case may well represent a 'bad 
decision made by a bad court',151 but the decision is here to stay and, therefore, 
Parliament should turn its attention to resolving some of the problems that have been 
created by the decision.  
V  POSTSCRIPT 
Since this article was written, the federal Parliament passed the Workplace Relations 
Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth), which introduced significant amendments to 
the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). The Work Choices amendments affect the 
provisions discussed in this article in two ways: 
First, the Work Choices amendments repealed pt VIB of the Workplace Relations Act 
1996 (Cth) and introduce a new pt VB, Workplace Agreements. However, many of the 
current features under pt VIB have been retained under the new pt VB, although with 
different numbering. Reference has already been made to the new provisions in the 
footnotes throughout this article.  
Secondly, the Work Choices amendments removed the requirement of certification 
for workplace agreements. Under the new pt VB, individual and collective agreements 
will not require the certification of the Commission. Rather, the agreements will take 
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affect after being lodged with the Office of the Employment Advocate. However, while 
this may seem to overcome many of the problems discussed above, it is submitted that 
the Work Choices amendments will not reduce the uncertainty caused by the Electrolux 
decision. The reason for this is that the new procedure of lodging agreements is not 
conclusive of the agreements' legal force under the Act. The new provisions introduce 
the concept of 'prohibited content'. The new law provides for the invalidation of an 
agreement to the extent that it contains prohibited content, and penalties (albeit in 
limited circumstances) for employers who lodge an agreement that contains prohibited 
content. Clearly, the new provisions shift the responsibility of vetting the agreements 
from the Commission over to the parties, which is consistent with the effect of the 
Electrolux case as discussed above.  
The difficulty created by the Work Choices amendments is that 'prohibited conduct' 
is not set out in the Act, but rather will be determined by regulation. There has been 
extensive discussion about what might be prohibited content, and it would seem that 
bans on contracting will certainly be included in the regulations as prohibited content, 
although as shown above, bans on contracting (as opposed to mere regulation of 
contracting to secure wage parity between workers covered by the agreement and 
contractors) are already classed as being outside of the lawful contents of agreements. 
Furthermore, protected industrial action cannot be undertaken in respect of claims to 
include prohibited content in an agreement.152  
Therefore, it is submitted that the problems generated by the Electrolux decision are 
by no means solved by the Work Choices amendments. On the contrary, the meaning of 
prohibited content in the new regulations is likely to be vigorously tested by unions 
and employer groups, leading to more litigation and increasing delays and uncertainty 
in negotiating workplace agreements.  
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
152  See the new Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 108A. 
